



Computer Security

CS 2110 28 November, 2017

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
Announcements

- Course evals are available. Fill them in by 3pm tomorrow to receive an extra 1% towards your final grade.
- Recitations this week will be on a variety of topics, you can attend whichever one you want:

Tu 12:20 Bard 140	Regular Expressions	We 12:20 Bard 140	Debugging
Tu 12:20 Hollister 368	Kooky Data Structures	We 12:20 Olin 218	Dynamic Program
Tu 12:20 Olin 216	Sound	We 1:25 Bard 140	Version Control
Tu 12:20 Upson 216	Coding Interviews	We 1:25 Upson 216	Optionals
Tu 1:25 Hollister 206	Java 9	We 2:30 Bard 140	TBA
Tu 1:25 Hollister 312	Dynamic Programming	We 2:30 Phillips 407	Coding Interviews
Tu 2:30 Hollister 110	TBA	We 7:30 Upson 142	Coding Interviews
Tu 2:30 Olin 165	Collections		
Tu 3:35 Bard 140	Distributed Computing		


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Computer Science



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Computer Security



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Computer Security

- Security is about making sure that computers behave correctly
- A **secure system** should:
 - 1) Do what it is supposed to do
 - 2) Not do anything else

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What might go wrong

```

public class ObjectStore {
    private Object[] objects;

    public ObjectStore(int len){
        objects = new Object[len];
    }

    public Object read(int i){
        return objects[i];
    }

    public void store(int i, Object o){
        objects[i]= o;
    }
}
    
```

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OpenSSL

www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs2110/2017f

Professors: David Gries, Adrian Sampson, Eleanor Birrell, Fall 2017

```

Lecture
-----
CS2110
be in
section

Lecture
notes
than
lectures
and th
at.

Recitations
-----
It is important to attend a weekly recitation, which are considered to be part of the required
classwork for the course. We often present material in recitation that is required but not covered in
the main lectures. You can switch from recitation to recitation but we like to know which one you are
in, in case the University needs to contact you. We added some recitations at a late date; please
switch to them if you can to balance out the number of students in each recitation. Use adddrop if
you switch sections.

Weekly recitation notes will be posted below as we finalize them.

CS2111
  
```

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Heartbleed

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What might go wrong


```

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}
  
```



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Skype Vulnerability

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What might go wrong

Thread 1 Thread 2

Initially, i = 0

```

Thread 1: tmp = load i;
           Load 0 from memory
           tmp = tmp + 1;
           store tmp to i;
           Store 1 to memory

Thread 2: Load 0 from memory
           tmp = load i;
           Store 1 to memory
           tmp = tmp + 1;
           store tmp to i;
  
```

time ↓


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Copy-on-write (COW)

- Common resource optimization
- When someone copies a file, it doesn't really get copies
- If/when someone modifies the "copy" the original file gets copied and modified

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Privilege Escalation



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So how do we fix this?



- Testing
- Bug finding tools



FindBugs™

- White-hat hacking



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So how do we fix this?




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Security by Design

- Build secure, trustworthy computer systems/applications/etc.
- Define what the system is supposed to do
- Make sure it does that (and only that)

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How do we specify what systems are and are not supposed to do?

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Example: Data Privacy

Facebook app now reads your smartphone's text messages? THE TRUTH Blame Android, says social network



Apple will share face mapping data from the iPhone X with third-party app developers

Google Accused of V...

Lawsuit Claims Disney Is Violating COPPA, Tracking Kids in 42 Apps

Windows 10 data collection found to violate privacy laws

AccuWeather's iPhone app may track you even if you opt out (update)



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How do we make systems secure?

Threat Models

Threat Models

A CRYPTO NERD'S IMAGINATION:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED. LET'S BUILD A MILLION-DOLLAR CLUSTER TO CRACK IT.

NO GOOD! IT'S 4096-BIT RSA!

BLAST! OUR EVIL PLAN IS FOILED!

WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED. DRUG HIM AND HIT HIM WITH THIS \$5 WRENCH UNTIL HE TELLS US THE PASSWORD.

GOT IT.

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Example: Threat Model for Data Privacy

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Approaches to security

- Axiomatic security
- You trust someone else to get it right

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Approaches to security

- Axiomatic security
 - You trust someone else to get it right
- Constructive security
 - E.g., compiler checks, automated proofs

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37

String s=5;

30

Approaches to security

- Axiomatic security
 - You trust someone else to get it right
- Constructive security
 - E.g., compiler checks, automated proofs
- Synthetic security
 - Modify the code to add checks (e.g., monitoring)

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Approaches to security


- Axiomatic security
 - You trust someone else to get it right
- Constructive security
 - E.g., compiler checks, automated proofs
- Synthetic security
 - Modify the code to add checks (e.g., monitoring)
- Deterrence through accountability
 - Make sure you'll notice if something goes wrong



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

Example: Data Privacy from SGX

- Policy enforcement implemented by external monitor that runs on DHs
 - monitor can send/receive values from DS
 - monitor shares values with authorized programs co-located at DH
 - auth decisions based on credentials
- unauthorized values are cryptographically sealed with associated policy to prevent authorized use
- monitor maintains taint for each program, automatically derives policies for derived values



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Security

```

[{"curr": "1",
 "states": {"1": {"name": "s1-1",
 "permissions": {"aggregate": true,
 "transitions": {"aggregate": "s2",
 "defaultPermission": false},
 "2": {"name": "s2-1",
 "permissions": {"fulfill": true,
 "mission": true}}}}}]
  
```

